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1 Introduction
Debates about science, participation and
development have been pursued in both
Development Studies and Science and Technology
Studies (Leach et al. 2005; Collins and Evans 2002).
Participation (it is argued) assumes two forms –
deliberative and performative. Deliberative
participation seeks agreement on strategies through
discursive means. Performative participation bases
itself upon involvement in a set of actions (including
both ritual and utilitarian actions). Citizen juries and
stakeholder consultations are examples of
deliberative participation. Performative participation
covers modes of action ranging from political rituals
(Perri 6 2007) to technological interventions such as
farmer field schools and participatory breeding
(Almekinders and Hardon 2007). The two forms of
participation appear to involve distinct mechanisms
– rational persuasion and a broadly ‘musical’ kind of
process. The scope of rational deliberation is limited
by ‘leadership effects’. Appropriately configured
performative mechanisms may be useful in breaking
out of discursive ‘loops’. The possibility is tested
through an experiment in war-zone seed-system
rehabilitation.
2 Mechanisms of participation
2.1 Deliberative participation
In deliberative events, participants respond (it is
supposed) to high quality arguments (Jackman and
Sniderman 2006: 274). Deliberation allows for the
expression of preferences and negotiation of
consensus or compromise. Discursive reason replaces
power (Habermas 1989) and better decisions emerge
(e.g. more effective, widely supported policies, etc).
Humphreys and co-workers (2006: 584) seek to test
whether deliberative participation ‘return[s] the
benefits attributed’. They do so through analysis of
data from an experiment in deliberative democracy
in the West African island republic of Sao Tome and
Principe.
The government of this small but newly oil-rich
democracy agreed to implement a national
consultation about corruption and government
expenditure. Humphreys and colleagues were
involved in designing and monitoring the
consultation. A total of 148 groups met to discuss a
set of 12 basic questions covering topics such as
health, transport and education.1 Discussions were
assisted by facilitators drawn from the National
Statistical Office and various civil society
organisations. Facilitators were required to report
the views of participants and a degree of consensus
reached. Allocation of facilitators to specific
meetings was randomised to permit statistically valid
assessment of the extent to which group
preferences displayed leadership effects.
A significant part of the variance in views expressed
by groups was explained by the identity of the leader.
Groups led by women tended to prefer local health
provision to centralised hospitals; groups led by older
men were less critical of corruption, and so forth.
Depending on the question being considered, leader
identity accounted for between one-fifth and one-
third of variance in the views expressed. Highly
statistically significant leadership-correlated effects
were found in answers to 11 out of 12 questions
discussed. Furthermore, ‘fully two-thirds of the
variation in the reported levels of consensus achieved
during the discussions can be accounted for on the
basis of leader specific affects alone’ (Humphreys et
al. 2006: 608). The article concludes:
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The results are unambiguous: while 3500
adults were consulted, the actual outcomes
were in fact largely determined by only a
handful of individuals. Knowing which member
of the country’s political elite was randomly
selected to lead the discussions provides an
extraordinarily powerful indicator of what
policies the participants in each group
ostensibly supported.
(Humphreys et al. 2006: 604)
What does this tell us about how deliberative
participation works? More than ‘high quality
argument’ must have been involved. In fact, the
authors suggest participants may have imposed self-
censorship, or leaders misreported meetings, were
active in persuading participants to adopt certain
views, or managed information to favour achieved
outcomes. If rational choice is the mechanism of
deliberative participation it supports only a highly
bounded rationality (cf. Arrow 1994).
With regard to everyday political arguments
Jackman and Sniderman (2006: 274) have proposed
that, ‘two mechanisms … argumentation and
deliberation’ are involved. Data which they analysed
from an experiment in France suggest that low
quality (unreasoned) arguments also play a role. This
introduces us to the idea of a performative
mechanism – in this case, force of argument. It is not
the content but the act of argumentation that
shapes opinion.
What kinds of performance might have shaped
opinion on Sao Tome and Principe? Many West
Africans attain adulthood through initiation into
sodalities (‘secret societies’). One explanation for the
spread of these sodalities is that they counter-
balanced the power of mercantile elites during the
period of the Atlantic slave trade (cf. d’Azevedo
1962). Although Humphreys et al. (2006) do not
report on the presence of sodalities in rural Sao
Tome and Principe, performative mechanisms
invoking respect for leadership via initiation would
definitely be worth hypothesising for adjacent areas
on the West African mainland.2 Deliberation, in such
circumstances, may be seen (by participants) not as
an opportunity to debate different points of view
but to demonstrate commitment to a group
(Douglas 1970). To address leadership effects may
require not better arguments but a different kind of
performance.
2.2 Performative participation
Rational choice rests on assumptions of
methodological individualism (the hypothesis that
individual agency is, in fact, the basis for all decision-
making in social life).3 A theoretical tradition
established by Durkheim (but to which, according to
Lockwood (1992), Gramsci’s notion of hegemony
should also be assimilated), counters this approach.
Durkheim (1964 [1893]) argues that the individual is
the product of a group process through which
persons are rendered sacrosanct. Theory focuses on
explaining elementary (i.e. foundational) processes
through which collective representations and sacred
elements (i.e. moral orders) are shaped. A key
mechanism is the rite (Durkheim 1995 [1912]).
Ritual is often viewed in terms of the recapitulation
of emotional states associated with moral alignments
or shared values (collective representations). This has
created the impression that the rite is a kind of
signalling system based on a symbolic code. For
example, Rappaport (1999: 405) claims that ‘at the
heart of ritual … is the relationship of performers to
performances of invariant sequences of acts and
utterances which they did not encode’.
Durkheimian theory is (in fact) less concerned with
symbolic and recapitulative aspects of rites than with
their functioning as mechanisms through which
shared feelings and values are first generated (Bellah
2005; Collins 2004; Perri 6 2007). Acting as a group
stirs emotional excitement. Collective energy
becomes fixed upon symbols or ideas with sacred
significance. Taking part in a rite creates belief
through emotional entrainment. Belief is not the
cause of the action but its product. We believe
because we pray. Gods and spirits (and symbolic
paraphernalia) are epiphenomena. What matters is
the cult; ‘it is always the cult that is efficacious … we
must act, and we … must repeat the necessary acts
as often as is necessary to renew their effects’
(Durkheim 1995 [1912]: 420).
As a label for this generative aspect of ritual action
Durkheim used the term ‘effervescence’.4 It was
through ‘effervescence’ that the French National
Assembly voted on 4 August 1789 (against its own
interest) to abolish feudalism. The modern French
nation was founded in a sudden ‘act of sacrifice and
abnegation that each … member had refused to make
the night before and by which all were surprised the
morning after’ (Durkheim 1995 [1912]: 212).
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‘Effervescence’ flags an important insight concerning
rites as modes of collective action, and their effect,
but the underlying mechanism is far from being fully
understood (Perri 6 2007). Possibilities of progress
towards a more fully elaborated account can be
glimpsed from the perspective of bio-musicology.
Moving to a beat seems to be a uniquely human
capability (Benzon 2002). Measured responses to
musical stimuli show that ‘brain neurodynamics
tracks musicklike [sic] sequences more accurately
than nonmusicklike [sic] sequences’ (Benzon
2002: 43). This suggests a ‘morphodynamic
isomorphism between the tonal flow of music and
its neurophysiological substrates’ (Benzon 2002: 42,
quoting Wallin 1991). Musicians have often reported
‘out of body’ experiences, and a sense of being part
of something bigger when a performance flows
well.5 Benzon (2002) sees this as evidence that music
and dance are a crucial means through which
individual consciousnesses become coordinated.
Examining a case of first contact between Europeans
and Australian aboriginals, Cross (2006) explores the
implications of evidence that the event was ‘danced
out’. Music, he avers, is a sphere of ‘unassigned
intentionality’ through which humans rehearse the
possibility of sociality. The give-and-take of a medium
for social interaction ‘with inexplicitness at its core’
generates elementary understandings of coordination
and interaction that eventually blossom into the idea
of justice (Cross 2006). It is the action of give-and-
take that creates space for notions of cooperation.6
Here, Cross’s argument will be extended to include
technological means, conceived of as ‘instruments of
human life’.7 Too often perceived mainly or exclusively
in terms of knowledge or kit, technology is a way of
doing things. Doing things has a double aspect – it
both achieves material outcomes and fixes social
values, through aligning energies and emotional
commitments, among the group engaged in the
‘doing’.8 In this sense, I make no fundamental
distinction between the instruments deployed by
musician and engineer. The technology of rice
agriculture (in the West African case considered
below) includes both drums and hoes. The hoe
shapes the soil at the same time as the drum aligns
the movements of the workers doing the shaping. It
is proper to consider both as instruments of
agricultural activity. In short, the emphasis below is
performative, with specific recognition of the rite-
like character of many kinds of technical practice.9
The rite-like character of seed-system distribution in
a context of emergency food security in an African
war zone will be stressed.
The material to be examined derives from studies in a
war-affected Upper West African country – Sierra
Leone. The main agricultural staple of the Upper
West African coastal zone is rice. An unusually large
range of rice types is deployed by small-scale
farmers, as a consequence of this being the only
region in the world in which rice is the main staple
where two separately domesticated species of rice
are cultivated side by side.10 Seeds spread through
many means. These include natural causes, friendship
networks, and theft, as well as through conscious
efforts at dissemination. Localised reciprocity has
technical advantages where (as here) a large number
of seed types is suited to a wide range of localised
applications. Seed reciprocity (it will be argued) also
sustains egalitarian collective representations. By
displacing farm populations and ending local seed
reciprocities war undermined egalitarian cultural
values. Postwar humanitarianism unwittingly boosted
patrimonial political values by distributing seed in a
top-down manner. Efforts were then made to re-
boot egalitarian seed exchange. Data suggest that
this activity was effective, and a corresponding
strengthening of cooperative values was reported.
Preliminary assessment suggests that the ‘inexplicit
inclusiveness’ of egalitarian seed distribution helped
enrich rituals of deliberative participation, and
provided a challenge to ‘leadership effects’.
3 Case study: engineering food security in
postwar central Sierra Leone
A student-led rebel movement protesting one-party
rule and corruption in a diamond-rich economy
began an insurgency in the forests of eastern and
southern Sierra Leone in 1991 (Richards 1996). Rural
populations in central Sierra Leone (a region noted
for its rice surpluses, supplying the diamond districts
in particular) were first displaced in 1994–5, when
the insurgent movement – staffed mainly by capture
of socially detached rural youths – failed to capture
the provincial headquarters town of Bo (December
1994) and went to ground in isolated farming
country north-west of Bo.
Fleeing villagers mostly sought protection from the
army and international peace-keepers in camps
around Bo, but began to return to their farms under
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a short-lived peace agreement in 1996–7. The area
had been extensively looted for food by rebel
fighters, and returning farmers lacked food, seeds
and tools. An international development agency
(henceforth ‘the agency’) took on responsibilities for
four chiefdoms (traditional administrative units)
closest to rebel-held territory in 1998–9. In the first
instance, it supplied food-for-work, to re-establish
farming after two or three years of abandonment.
Later it mainly supplied tools and seeds.
The return of farmers to their villages was led by local
hunters (later formed into a counter-insurgency
militia by a British–South African company linked to
diamond mining). The rebels vented fury at the
previous one-party regime through atrocities against
its local representatives (Richards 2005a). Chiefs were
among the last to return. Seeking to avoid association
with a compromised pre-war administrative system,
the agency formed instruments of its own, Village
Development Committees (VDC).
The VDC was supposedly a group of civilian
volunteers tasked with helping the agency (through
superior knowledge of the local social landscape) to
distribute inputs to the most needy groups and
individuals. Each VDC had a male and female leader,
and excluded chiefs and fighters. It assisted the
agency to register genuine beneficiaries and
accounted for distribution at the village level.
But things were not working out well. VDCs
seemingly commandeered benefits for their own
use, reverting to practices, in regard to development
resources, associated with chiefs in the pre-war
period. Local populations – especially those subsisting
in bush hiding places in no-man’s-land (Mende
sokuihun, lit. ‘corners’) – were missing from
registration documents. The first names on every
distribution list, by contrast, were those of the VDC.
Tackled about these anomalies VDC members explained
they had been selected as responsible, community-
minded persons. They took this as confirmation of
their status as patrons (Mende numuwaisia, lit. ‘big
people’, i.e. those with many social responsibilities).11
Thus they needed to ensure they had enough to
distribute via their own patrimonial networks.
‘Corner’ dwellers, and other internally displaced
populations, were ‘unknown quantities’ (unspoken
but implied was the assumption that anyone who
had failed to flee during the rebel incursion must in
some way be a collaborator). The VDC membership,
it was explained, could be accountable to the agency
only for its own clients. This made clear one of the
problems associated with patrimonialism – its far
from comprehensive scope, excluding as many as it
protects.
Increased exclusion entailed by a decaying system of
patronage was plausibly one of the major causes of
the war (Richards 2005a). The Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) justified its campaign of violence on the
grounds that its members were those excluded from
crumbling systems of state educational provision.
Even government-loyalist ‘hunters’ protecting local
villages had begun to articulate ‘rebel’ thoughts
about their lack of access to humanitarian
distribution.
The agency was also unhappy with its own
performance. Inputs (seeds and tools) were
substandard. For example, a consignment of badly
deteriorated imported groundnuts was certified as
acceptable and distributed to returning farmers.
Women (major planters of groundnuts) cleared
farms in very insecure conditions only to receive
inputs with germination potential of less than 10 per
cent, but they had been afraid to criticise at the
time. The agency was seen as their only protector
and patron in conditions of great extremity.
A decision was made to change course.12 The agency
sought to address evident programme defects and
challenge patrimonialism as the only viable mode of
social accountability.13 An obvious problem was that
deliberation risked triggering ‘leadership effects’.
Things might work out differently if ‘inexplicit
inclusiveness’ based on practice enriched the
deliberative process. The intention was not to impose
new accountabilities but engage local alternatives.14
One of the first issues to be tackled through
performative means was the agency’s own
(unwitting) patrimonial role. This was handled by
adopting a rights-based approach to food security.
Exemplary manifestation of the agency’s role as a
duty holder in regard to food security was attempted
through introduction of two new practices –
registration of all residents in the area as
beneficiaries (not just heads of recognised
households) and supply of seed types according to
individual user preferences.15
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The first practice made clear that everybody counted;
no one was to be excluded, whatever their origins or
status. The second practice attempted to correct one
of the ways in which the agency had unwittingly
undermined an important mechanism of local food
security.
Pre-war seed acquisition depended on two main (and
contrasted) strategies. A farmer short of rice seed
might seek a bulk loan from a better supplied farmer
in which ‘non-market’ repayment rates cemented a
patron–client relationship. But poorer farmers also
sought to improve food security through
experimentation, i.e. careful adaptation of local and
incoming seed types to a range of wetland and dry
land farming niches (Richards 1986).16 The major
modality for acquiring materials for experimentation
was to swap or gift small amounts of seed.17 Pre-war
food security thus engaged two major normative
frames – hierarchical values (patronage) and an
egalitarian culture of gift exchange.18
Rehabilitation via VDCs, it was now recognised, had
boosted patrimonialism at the expense of
egalitarianism. The new project set out to correct
this imbalance. The distributional modality was
changed so that all registered persons were offered
seeds of choice in 10 kg starter packs, where
previously the agency had supplied recommended
varieties in bulk to household heads as nominated by
VDCs. The new approach, it was envisaged, would
help restore pre-war levels of adaptive agro-diversity
and thus kick start a war-damaged performative
mechanism of egalitarian social cooperation.
A link was then sought with the deliberative process.
A new ritual was proposed – the village peace-and-
rights day, modelled on ceremonies of ancestral
remembrance (Mende leeni, leebi, cf. Krio: awujo).19
Peace-and-rights days were launched by ancestral
libations to invoke peace. The main part of the day
was taken up with deliberations over causes of local
conflicts, using a human rights framework. Closure
was signalled by the public distribution of seed packs
to every person in the locality recorded in project
registration documents. Bags were a convenient size
to head-load home, colour coded by gender and age.
The principle of inclusive distribution was made
evident to all.
This ritualised cycle of meetings was supposed to
become an annual event, to address matters likely to
disrupt or reinforce the peace. The second event in
the cycle was supposed to review the extent to
which social cooperation had been boosted by
egalitarian seed distributions, thus creating a
feedback loop from performance to deliberation.
Later stages were disrupted by a donor decision to
break apart the performative and deliberative
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Table 1a Knowledge of VDC by gender
Yes No All
n (%) n (%) n (%)
Female 234 52 220 48 454 100
Male 236 62 143 38 379 100
All 470 56 363 44 833 100
Table 1b Knowledge of VDC by age and gender
Male Female All
n (%) n (%) n (%)
Elder 95/161 59 89/182 49 184/343 54
Youth 141/218 65 145/272 53 286/490 58
All 236/379 62 234/454 52 470/833 56
elements, thus effectively ending the experiment.20
The notion of fostering local debate about
patrimonialism may have been viewed as ill-timed in
relation to British support for a tradition-minded
postwar regime intent on restoring the power of
chiefs to the countryside (Fanthorpe 2006;
Jackson 2007).21
The analysis here presented draws on a 10 per cent
randomly sampled ‘baseline’ survey compiled during
the first two years of operation,22 complemented by
observation of peace-and-rights days, attendance at
various village discussions and interviews with key
informants. Evidence in regard to three issues is
presented: the patrimonial character of the VDC, the
functioning of the performative mechanism, and the
modification of the deliberative process through
performative inputs.
4 Results
4.1 The patrimonial character of the VDC
Respondents were first asked whether they knew
about the VDC (Table 1a). Over the total baseline
sample (n = 833), 56 per cent said they were aware
of a VDC in their village. This knowledge was greater
among males (62 per cent) than females (52 per
cent). It was also slightly greater among younger
(58 per cent) than older people (54 per cent). The
most aware group was young men (65 per cent) and
the least aware group was older women (49 per
cent) (Table 1b).
Respondents were then asked about perceptions of
purpose of the VDC. Of the 470 persons claiming
knowledge of the VDC, 413 (86 per cent) gave a
total of 834 purposes. The major purposes reported,
classified by keywords, are listed in Table 2. Most
frequently used words referred to ‘development’
(200 mentions) and ‘unity’ (155 mentions).
Significantly, however, a sizeable group of words
referred to the VDC as meeting the agency’s own
needs – including facilitating visits (63 mentions) and
accommodation for project staff (67 mentions).
Attention was paid to how the VDC was formed.
Among those with knowledge of the VDC it was
overwhelmingly claimed that membership was
determined by appointment (240 instances) rather
than election (15 instances). Some respondents
explicitly stated that election was divisive. Qualities
required in a VDC member centred on ability, hard
work and organisational ability, although
trustworthiness was also mentioned 28 times
(Table 3).
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Table 2 Perceptions of purpose of VDC. Of 470 claims (56%) to know about the VDC (among 833
baseline interviewees), 413 (86%) persons stated a total of 834 purposes, classified by keywords
Accommodation (67), visitors (63) [97 persons]
Community (128), develop (200), participate (13), mobilise (9) [250 persons]
Conflict resolution (7), unity (155)
Construction (12), school (4)
Credit (9), inputs (12)
Liaison (8), manage (9), represent (9)
Government (6), NGO (49), the agency (27), chief (2)
Welfare (45)
Table 3 Keywords used to characterise appointment of VDC members
How chosen? By whom? Qualities required?
Appoint (240) All (4) Ability (40), active (13)
Elect (15) Community (222) Intelligent (8)
Nominate (20) Consensus (6) Lead (14)
Recommend (2) Entire (21) Organise (57)
Select (30) Meet (23) Participation (4)
– Chiefs (12) Unanimous (8) Sincere (7)
– Elders (7) Whole village (8) Trust (28)
– Unspecified (11) Work (44)
Respondents who supplied specific reasons for
appointment to the VDC (Table 4) were frank about
patrimonial factors. VDC members who were
nominated by the chiefs, were ‘big persons’ vying
among themselves, or had the resources to ‘host
strangers’ (i.e. to act as patrons).
Respondents with knowledge of the VDC were
asked whether they could name the male and
female chairs of the village VDC (Tables 5a,b).23 The
data presented relates to three larger villages
(Gondama, Mogbuama and Rogboya). For the first
two, there exist prior ethnographic data on
leadership patterns and patrimonial networks.
In Gondama and Rogboya, just over one-half of
respondents with knowledge of the VDC could (or
would) provide an actual name for the male chair. The
figure for Mogbuama was higher (76 per cent) but
this probably reflects the fact that this large village at
the head of a seasonally motorable track had been a
base for agency activities for several years. The correct
name for the male chair in Gondama was supplied by
87 per cent, but in Mogbuama and Rogboya by only
51 per cent and 40 per cent of those claiming to be
able to give such a name.
Overall, 58 per cent of interviewees in the three
villages offered a name for the male chair, but
40 per cent of these names were incorrect. In other
words, only 35 per cent of all inhabitants sampled in
the three villages in question could accurately name
the male chair of the VDC.24 Between four and eight
(incorrect) names were supplied for the male chair. In
Gondama and Mogbuama it was apparent from
information concerning ranked lineages and
numuwaisia that ‘incorrectly informed’ interviewees
were loyally naming their own patrons, not the
actual chair. Knowledge of the female chair was
comparably ‘deficient’ in Mogbuama and Rogboya. In
Gondama there was extensive knowledge of the
female chair, a politically well-connected daughter of
a former (female) Paramount Chief.
It can be concluded that VDCs comprised an existing
patrimonial elite, repackaged for agency purposes,
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Table 4 Specific reasons for appointment to VDC
Chiefs
Influential (2)
Vie for position (contest)
Nominated or selected by chiefs (5)
Able to lodge strangers, or feed and accommodate project staff (6)
Wealthy (3)
Appointed by their father
Nominated by the agency
Organise youth for work
Personality
Status useful for external representation
Table 5a Accuracy of knowledge of male chair of VDC
Village Number of times VDC chair named Names cited (names × citations)
Mogbuama 77/101 (76%) 6 names (1×39, 1×22, 1×11, 1×3, 2×1)
Gondama 71/132 (54%) 5 names (1×62, 1×6, 3×1)
Rogboya 46/90 (51%) 9 names (1×15, 1×10, 1×9, 1×3, 2×1, 3×2)
Table 5b Accuracy of knowledge of female chair of VDC
Village Number of times female chair named Names cited (name citations)
Mogbuama 77/101 (76%) 7 names (1×48, 1×13, 1×8, 2×3, 2×1)
Rogboya 47/90 (52%) 6 names (1×19, 1×16, 1×8, 1×2, 2×1)
and that this was widely understood to be the case.
That deliberation in meetings would tend to follow
along patrimonial lines can be readily anticipated
from the evidence that a substantial number of
interviewees loyally (if incorrectly) named their own
patron as head of the VDC. The group of one-third
to half of all respondents disclaiming any knowledge
of the VDC also deserve comment. Some
interviewees may have discreetly preferred to
disclaim knowledge rather than name a patron from
a faction to which they did not belong. But it is also
reasonable to suspect that further work might
discover the marginalised ‘underclass’ of former
‘corner dwellers’ within this sizeable group.
4.2 The functioning of the performative mechanism
The agency aimed to ‘re-boot’ a pre-war egalitarian
culture of seeds. What can be inferred about the
success of this strategy from data concerning seed
distribution? The baseline data set was compiled after
seed choices had been made. Data on farmer seed
requests can thus be compared to reported plantings
since resettlement (with or without previous project
support), and to reported pre-war plantings.
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Table 6 Farmer rice and groundnut plantings before and after displacement (prior to agency seed-packet
distribution)
Total plantings No. of farmers Types planted per farmer
Rice, postwar 1931 781 2.5
Groundnut, pre-war 711 391 1.8
Groundnut, postwar 398 318 1.3
Table 7a Rice diversity, rices per farmer, pre-war and postwar, by location
On road Off road
After displacement 880 rices, 337 farmers 1,051 rices, 366 farmers
– Rices per farmer 2.61 2.87
Before displacement 1,171 rices, 323 farmers 1,451 rices, 367 farmers
– Rices per farmer 3.62 3.95
Table 7b Rice diversity, rices per farmer, pre-war and postwar, by civic status
Citizens Strangers
After displacement 1,375 rices, 502 farmers 556 rices, 201 farmers
– Rices per farmer 2.73 2.77
Before displacement 1,875 rices, 495 farmers 747 rices, 195 farmers
– Rices per farmer 3.79 3.83
Average for all rice farmers before displacement is 3.82 varieties/farmer and after displacement 2.71 varieties
per farmer.
Table 7c Pre-war rice biodiversity by gender, age and ecology
Upland Lowland
Female (n = 454) 1.98 varieties/farmer (897 varieties) 1.02 varieties/farmer (465 varieties)
Male (n = 379) 2.16 varieties/farmer (819 varieties) 1.13 varieties/farmer (429 varieties)
Youth (n = 490) 1.97 varieties/farmer (963 varieties) 1.09 varieties/farmer (532 varieties)
Elder (n = 342) 2.20 varieties/farmer (754 varieties) 1.06 varieties/farmer (362 varieties)
It is evident from Table 6 that farmers were still
suffering a reduction in rice and groundnut choices,
compared with reported pre-war positions, when
the agency switched from bulk to individualised
distribution of seeds (2001). Pre-war, farmers
typically managed between two and six distinct rice
varieties per farm.25 According to base line data, pre-
war rice variety portfolios averaged 3.8 types per
farmer, but averaged only 2.7 types per farmer in
2001 (Table 7a). This implies that the experimental
seed system remained significantly depleted.
Portfolio sizes varied (both pre-war and postwar)
according to location (off-road/on-road) and civic
status (citizen/stranger). Strangers and more isolated
farmers had more rice varieties than citizen farmers
in more accessible locations (Table 7 a,b). Pre-war,
women and youths had slightly fewer varieties than
men and older people (Table 7c). Although portfolios
decline across the board when postwar plantings are
examined (Table 7a,b), the position of strangers and
more isolated farmers are preserved relative to pre-
war data (i.e. they have more rice varieties in both
cases). These data are consistent with the claim,
based on earlier findings (Richards 1986, 1995), that
seed is an important adaptive resource, especially
among more isolated and socially marginal groups of
farmers.
That farmers appreciated the technological logic of
agency seed intervention is apparent from the fact
that a great majority took the opportunity (from
2002) to expand the number of rice types to which
they had access (as opposed to acquiring more seed
of the best varieties). Table 8 breaks down 330
individual choices for rice according to whether the
variety was the same as any variety planted by the
requester in the previous year. The requested variety
differed in 75 per cent of the cases. Only one-
quarter of such requests related to a (lost) variety
planted pre-war. Three-quarters of requests (184)
were for varieties farmers had never planted before.
This result supports the claim that farmers value
experimentation.
Above, it was suggested those more marginal to the
patrimonial system are more likely to belong to the
group of villagers not recognising chairs of VDCs.
When the seed choices of this group (Table 9) are
compared with the choices of those who could
name VDC chairs (whether accurately or not) choice
for a variety never before planted is slightly higher in
the more marginalised group (75 per cent, compared
with 73 per cent). That most farmers sought novelty
is clear support for a conclusion that project
intervention strengthened the means to re-engage
in experimentation around rice.
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Table 8 Rice and groundnut requests, and whether a lost variety is replaced
A. A1. B. B1. B2. 
Requested Variety planted Requested variety Variety not Variety not planted 
variety planted last year and not planted last planted last year last year and not 
last year planted pre-war year but planted planted pre-war
pre-war
Rice 82 32 248 62 184
(n = 330) (25%) (39% of A) (75%) (25% B1+B2) (75% B1+B2)
Groundnut 131 28 387 153 171
(n = 518) (25%) (21% of A) (75%) (40% B1+B2) (60% B1+B2)
Table 9 Knowledge of VDC and rice requests
Change in rice variety Same as variety already grown All
Knowledge of VDC 109 (73%) 41 (27%) 150
No knowledge of VDC 68 (75%) 23 (25%) 92
All 177 64 242
About 60 per cent of the baseline sample chose
groundnuts not rice. Assigning seed choices to
individuals boosted the popularity of groundnuts,
especially among women and young males. This
group found cash shortages a pressing problem –
money to pay expenses for primary school children
was a major concern – and groundnuts are a ready
source of cash, as well as item of food. Choice for
new varieties (60 per cent) was also high for
groundnut (cf. Table 8) but not as high as for rice
(75 per cent). Contrary to the case of rice, choice of
groundnuts resulted in some reduction of diversity,
as assessed by the percentage of total seed
accounted for by the most requested variety
(Table 10). Seemingly, groundnut choices contributed
to the strengthening of individualism as a mode of
accountability, but offered less scope than rice to
support egalitarian norms associated with seed
experimentation. A groundnut farmer may be
grateful to turn to a patron when short of seed, but
because there are many fewer varieties of
groundnuts overall, when compared to rice, there is
less incentive to engage in variety swapping activity.
4.3 Modification of the deliberative process
through performative inputs
What is the evidence that the revived experimental
system facilitated escape from deliberative ‘leadership
effects’? The assessment below represents a
preliminary assessment of the ritual modification of
the deliberative process through inclusive seed
distribution as a performative element. A
considerable stock of observational material has yet
to be fully analysed.
Peace-and-rights rituals were well organised by
young, highly motivated agency staff, and
enthusiastically received by participants. Each event
began with ancestral libations, continued with
human rights awareness training, led on to a debate
(in groups and plenary) over causes of the war, and
was rounded off with seed distribution. Each
participant left for home head-loading a drawstring
colour-coded bag containing chosen seed. The
sorting and distribution of each participant’s rightful
bag generated considerable excitement, not unlike a
school diploma ceremony.
Participants considered that inclusive distribution in a
ritual context had established a new norm for
transparency over development inputs. Practical
evidence is to be seen in the well-maintained village
log books in which all subsequent visits by project
officials and other visitors are recording, stating the
purpose of visits and action promised. These entries
are used by villagers to ensure compliance by village
leaders and visiting outsiders with project
agreements. The log-book system survived the
termination of the project. Follow-up work also
uncovered instances of reference to peace-and-
rights day agreements being used to counter
attempts at enforced seed pooling. Informants stated
that inclusive seed distribution made them feel
personally responsible to raise a crop from the seed
they had chosen.26
There was also widespread agreement that ancestral
libations linked to concrete discussion of rights had
created a space for open discussion of ‘difficult’ issues,
notably patrimonial controls over development
resources and misappropriation of humanitarian
inputs. A digest of topics arising from early peace-
and-rights day discussions (2001–2) is presented in
Table 11. The extent to which participants were willing
openly to discuss abuses of patrimonial redistribution
(something I had not encountered in 20 years of
earlier field visits) is apparent.
How much this new openness can be directly
assigned to the peace-and-rights day intervention
itself requires further analysis. Periods spent in
refugee camps and towns opened the eyes of many
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Table 10 Range of variety requests, rice and groundnut, by gender
Requests Types Most requested variety 
(as % of all requests)
Rice Groundnut Rice Groundnut Rice Groundnut
Women 121 356 39 7 17% 81%
Men 217 175 45 4 15% 83%
villagers to the entrenched abuses of merchants and
ruling elites. Careful examination of the abundant
records of the actual peace-and-rights events
(including video evidence) is needed to provide a
better grasp of how the ritual process actually
worked. But the fact that even elders’ groups were
prepared to admit their own role in the patrimonial
abuses feeding war (Table 11) seems clear evidence
that ‘a constrained plurality of … ritual forms’ (Perri 6
2007) stimulates progress towards ‘organic solidarity’
(in this case, by helping to provide a framework for
settling competing claims of patrons and
egalitarians).
It should also be remarked that egalitarian seed
distribution was quickly perceived by elements more
distant from the ‘constrained plurality of the ritual
form’ (e.g. some government officials, and
numuwaisia residing in town) as a direct challenge to
patrimonial hegemony. Patrimonialism builds its
appeal by claiming to reduce social competition
under the wise leadership of a pater familias. Sceptics
thus several times predicted that inclusive seed
distribution, and meeting the choice of commoners,
would increase competition and strife. Specifically, it
was predicted that the new project seed distribution
modality would weaken inter- and intra-household
cooperation.
Reviewing the first two seasons of work, farmers
and field assistants found the opposite to be true.
Having a diversity of seed types locally available was
reported to have stimulated gift exchanges, boosting
inter-household cooperation. With stakes of
individuals so clearly mapped out some heads of
households noted that family members were more,
not less, willing to cooperate in a joint farm. In
evaluating individual choices there was more to
discuss, one group of farmers explained. Several
household heads reported they now took the
knowledge and opinions of wives or children more
seriously than before, as a result of seeing the
effectiveness of their seed choices. ‘Sharing seeds’
was an interactive performance all household
members could understand. This was said to have
enhanced the interest of farming together,
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Table 11 Some conflict-related grievances articulated in peace-and-rights days
Elders' group The heavy fines levied by chiefs on youths have led to many leaving the village. The chiefs 
are concerned that these youths will return and seek revenge on them. 
Youth group Chiefs do not allow youths to express their views. 
Youth group Chiefs victimise youths by imposing heavy and unjust fines, criminal summonses make 
youths run from the village, resulting in disunity and grievance. 
Women's group There is ... no support for vulnerable groups. 
Youth group Chiefs withhold benefits meant for the community, resulting in defiance by youths ... 
chiefs protect their own children from doing communal work. 
Women's group There is no proper distribution of humanitarian inputs. It is done according to who you know. 
Youth group Youths are never [appointed] chiefs, unless they become society [sodality] elders, even if
they are the best person, youths have no rights over elders; they are always in the wrong. 
Youth group Society [sodality] heads levy fines on youth in the bush, subject to no appeal, chiefs levy 
frequent contributions on youths for ‘development'; refusal or inability to pay brings a 
criminal summons and a fine, ‘up to Le 40,000, or whatever they need'. 
Youth group Those who pay fees and fines 'never see any development'. 
Youth group There is disrespect for youth leaders, youth leaders connive with chiefs to humiliate the 
youths. 
Women's group Displaced people were excluded from registration for humanitarian assistance. 
Source Archibald and Richards (2002).
comparable with an older performative practice
(hiring drummers to spur on group agricultural work,
Richards 1986, 2005b).
A brief return visit to the area after the experiment
ended suggested that patrimonial elites were busy
reasserting their grip over local deliberation. One
village commoner elected to a ‘reformed’ VDC after
peace-and-rights day deliberations explained how he
(and other commoners) had been systematically
undermined by numuwaisia spreading false
information. It had been suggested that the new
intake had been paid secret amounts of money by
the agency and, unlike true patrons, were unwilling
to share their windfall with the wider populace.
Higher echelons in the local male sodality had been
active in engineering this campaign, it was alleged.
The mechanism of deliberative distortion described
by Murphy (1990) – ‘hanging heads’ – apparently
remained in good working order. With donor
pressure for a simpler ‘workshop’ approach to rights-
based programming the possibility for practical
‘inexplicit inclusiveness’ to feed ritualised scrutiny of
alternative accountabilities was ended.
Overall, however, there seem enough positive
pointers in the present case study to justify further
experimentation in linking deliberative and
performative participation. Every settlement –
however temporary or remote – was included.
Registration approached 100 per cent of the resident
population. Seed distribution satisfied more than
90 per cent of choices (with seed quality higher than
government standards). Gift-based seed
experimentation was boosted. Seed-based
egalitarian accountabilities fed back into peace-and-
rights days. Vigorous deliberations about patrimonial
abuses took place. But deliberative and performative
aspects were later split apart, and patrimonial
‘leadership effects’ reasserted themselves. With new
sources of global patronage emanating from the G8
and private agencies engaging with African poverty it
is more than ever necessary to develop viable
antidotes to elite capture, including the capture of
poverty alleviation by global elites.
5 Conclusion
This article has examined deliberative and
performative participation in a programme for
agrarian rehabilitation in the aftermath of a West
African civil war. A new approach (the linking of
performance and deliberation in humanitarian
assistance) has been described. Seed distribution was
redesigned to strengthen war-damaged modalities
of cooperation; deliberation was modified to create
a ‘constrained plurality of ritual forms’. Evidence
suggests that the chosen ‘instrument’ of
performative participation (inclusive seed distribution)
functioned as envisaged, in both technical and ritual
terms. Incorporation of seed distribution within the
rituals of peace-and-rights days appears to have
assisted excluded voices to resound in the
deliberative arena. Whether and how far this
approach might have contributed to the forging of
robust local institutions over the longer term cannot
be easily assessed, since donors promptly ended the
experiment. But findings seem sufficiently promising
to merit further efforts to link deliberative and
performative participation. Instruments designed
with regard to their impact on both human values
and material outcomes will bring us closer to
realisation of the Durkheimian vision of ‘technology
… as a branch of sociology’. The phrase ‘social
engineering’ might then strike a less discordant note.
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Notes
* I am especially grateful to Macartan Humphreys
(Columbia University) for comments on the draft
and suggestions with regard to the literature on
participation in political science, and to Perri 6
(Nottingham Trent University) for insights based
on his recent work on political ritual. I would also
like to acknowledge the helpful advice of an
anonymous reviewer. Design of the original
project was undertaken jointly with Steven
Archibald, drawing on findings from a project on
Human Rights and Forced Migration directed by
Dr Josh de Wind (Social Science Research
Council) with funding from the Mellon
Foundation. This support is gratefully
acknowledged. I alone am responsible for
opinions expressed here.
1 Participation was approximately 5 per cent of the
total adult population.
2 Sao Tome and Principe were uninhabited until
acquired by the Portuguese at the beginning of
the period of the Atlantic slave trade. Many
agricultural labourers arrived from the West
African mainland as slaves or indentured
labourers. Island Creoles were long sensitive to
the risks of re-enslavement, and continue to
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commemorate the Batepa massacre in 1953, a
wave of violence unleashed by colonial landlords
against islanders resisting rumoured
reintroduction of indentured plantation labour.
3 According to Arrow (1994) the qualifier
‘methodological’ distinguishes the empirical
hypothesis (that, in fact, humans make decisions
as individuals) from ‘normative individualism’ (the
doctrine that humans ought to take decisions
individually).
4 Other labels have been proposed to convey the
same sense of ritual taking on a life of its own;
Randall Collins (2004) suggests ‘sub-cognitive
ritualism’ and Lockwood (1992) proposes ‘hyper-
ritual’. Neither term seems much improvement
upon ‘effervescence’.
5 ‘[Gustav Holst] was so carried away by the
Sanctus (of the Bach Mass in B minor) that he felt
as if he were floating in the air, and found himself
clutching the sides of the chair to prevent his
head bumping against the roof of the cathedral’
(Imogen Holst 1969: 11–12).
6 Woodiwiss (2005) seeks the origins of human
rights in the performance of sacrifice (cf. Girard
1979); but rehearsing social coordination through
ritual can also lead (via positive feedback) to
deadly effects, e.g. it can stir massacre in times of
war (Richards 2007; Stone 2004).
7 The phrase is Durkheim’s (‘Technologie’ (1901)
Annee Sociologique 4: 593–4).
8 ‘Technology, considered in this aspect, is a branch
of sociology’ (Durkheim 1901)
9 Thus I differ from Perri 6 (2007: 42) who
differentiates rites and tools.
10 For recent evidence of inter-specific gene flow
see Barry et al. (2007) and Nuijten and Treuren
(2007).
11 Many VDC members also occupied high-ranking
positions in the local male and female sodalities.
12 Steven Archibald and the present author were
invited to design and monitor the new approach
(cf. Humphreys et al. 2006) and agreed to do so if
findings could be published (cf. Archibald and
Richards 2002).
13 Following Durkheim (1897), Douglas (1970)
proposes four basic modes of social accountability
(the grid-group scheme) – hierarchy, egalitarian,
individualist and fatalist. Robust social institutions
(Douglas suggests) require accommodation
between the different modes.
14 Murphy (1990) shows that deliberation among the
Mende divides public meetings into two parts.
The first is a public session in which non-elites are
encouraged to express their views. The second is a
private conclave among elders (hite wu, ‘lowering
of the head’), to determine what actual decision
to take.
15 After local consultation it was decided to register
every person above ten years old. A specialist in
local seeds, Dr Malcolm Jusu (cf. Jusu 1999), was
engaged to identify and source seed choices of
requisite high quality.
16 Mende villagers recognise (Richards 1993) that
ordinary farmers are drawn to experimentation
(hugoo, ‘to look into’) while numuwaisia are
preoccupied with deliberation (njia, ‘dispute’).
17 In an unpublished survey of nine chiefdoms from
central to NW Sierra Leone in 1987 (by Richards
and others, cf. Richards 1997) 490 farmers
provided information on first acquisition of 79 per
cent of current rice types – 32 per cent came
from loans or purchase and 68 per cent from gifts
and exchange. Data on 226 recent adoptions
showed that 6 per cent came via ‘chance factors,
36 per cent via loans and purchase and 58 per
cent through gifts and exchange.
18 Market transactions played a minor role.
19 Such ceremonies (cf. leebi naani – Muslim ‘40 day’
ceremony) have become common in villages as a
way of remembering the unburied dead from the
war (Alfred Mokuwa, pers. comm.).
20The project was funded by EU and Norwegian
sources in 2001, and intended to run for four
years (to 2005). DFID became a joint funder of
the main project. The long-term involvement of
the project designers was a requirement of EU
funding. Our involvement was ended without
formal notification in 2003. The project
management had been advised to cut out the
‘clever stuff’ (Steven Archibald, pers. comm.; cf.
Fanthorpe 2003). The agency continued to attract
support for continuation activities from 2005, but
now separated (topically and regionally) into
human rights and agro-technical components.
21 The main party (the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party)
in the democratic government elected to power
in 1996, briefly deposed in 1997, and restored by
Nigerian military intervention in 1998, had
historically been a strong supporter of ‘traditional’
chieftaincy (a system of local governance devised
by the British in the colonial period). At the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in
Edinburgh in 1997, the British Prime Minister, Tony
Blair, had been presented with a document
outlining the SLPP government-in-exile’s
priorities for its first 100 days back in power. This
included a request for British aid to help chiefs to
return to their rural chiefdoms in the interests of
security. The Paramount Chief Restoration Project
– though controversial, not least because it was
not unconnected to the counter-insurgency
strategy developed by private security companies
operating in Sierra Leone – became a significant
item in British aid to postwar Sierra Leone.
22 ‘Random sampling’ in rural Africa is frequently
compromised by lack of an accurate sample
frame. Here, we were able to sample from
detailed and accurate project registration records.
23 Further details can be found in Richards et al. (2004).
24 The agency recognised only one male and one
female head per VDC.
25 A large village would have had between 30 and
40 distinct varieties (Richards 1986). The total
number of distinct varieties probably approached
100–150 across the four chiefdoms, and 300–400
nationally.
26 That is, to raise a crop from the supplied seed,
and thus have the means to engage in subsequent
informal exchanges. Data on subsequent
transactions (swaps, gifts, etc.) are limited. A post-
project seed-tracking exercise, currently in the
planning stage, will seek to cover this issue.
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